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INTERNATIONAL Co-OPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE. Edited by
Hans Smit. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1965. Pp. xxxiv, 486.
$17.50.
The title of this work should be qualified in two ways. First, the
designation "Europe" is not quite accurate, since the book only
deals with fifteen countries-Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England,
Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland-which include no Eastern
European countries (despite the increasing number of commercial
exchanges with them) and which together do not even comprise the
whole of Western Europe. Second, because of the sources from which
the work was compiled, it tends to emphasize problems of international cooperation in litigation which are of special interest to
common-law jurists, while only broadly reviewing the practices of
the fifteen European countries. The book consists of a number of
reports which were prepared for Columbia University's "Project on
International Procedure." These reports attempted to examine how
the United States, with its notorious reluctance for adopting treaties
dealing with international judicial cooperation, could modify and
improve its existing rules to meet the practical needs of foreign
countries. The Columbia project stimulated the United States
Congress to create the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, which was charged with studying means by which the
system of international cooperation in litigation could be improved.
The results obtained (set out in the work's appendix) are undoubtedly significant. They provide means not only for improving
the judicial assistance which foreign countries seek from the United
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States, but also for liberalizing the procedural rules of American
courts, thus making it easier for these courts to utilize the judicial
help proffered by foreign countries. With regard to this last point,
special mention should be made of the reform of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for District Courts, which include notable innovations in
the American practice and procedure (app. B, pp. 438-44). The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules frankly stated that "the ordinary
rules of evidence are often inapposite to the problem of determining
foreign law" (p. 441); consequently, it proposed that when such a
problem arises, courts should be permitted to consider "any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43." This attempt to
broaden the courts' powers to take cognizance of foreign law without
imposing a formal obligation to "take judicial notice of it" (p. 442)
introduces an approach very close to that which prevails among
European courts (France, p. 150; Italy, p. 279). Thus, the concrete
solutions which are worked out by various countries under the
pressure of practical necessities may result in a greater uniformity of
law than one would expect given the differences between their respective legal systems.
Despite these encouraging signs, serious difficulties still exist, as
the reports collected in Smit's book amply demonstrate. The book
presents a quantity of data (sometimes with such excessive detail that
the main structures of the systems tend to be obscured) in which
many problems come to light which are not easily soluble. Thus,
even when the difficulties inherent in obtaining evidence abroad are
overcome, problems of evaluating the evidence still will confront
the domestic judge. For example, in the civil-law countries, the
evidence is not normally recorded in a verbatim transcript, but
rather in the judges' summation (Belgium, p. 39; France, p. 161;
Germany, p. 204; Italy, p. 260; Norway, p. 294), although the courts
of these countries will usually consent should the foreign judge
request a verbatim transcript. Similarly, the principle of cross-examination is alien to the judicial practices of civil law, in which the
examination of witnesses is carried out by the judge. There is no
doubt that American judges view the latter means of taking evidence
with some concern and are thus influenced in their approach toward
letters rogatory (comments, p. 12 n.76).
Another difficulty involves the reluctance of foreign courts to
cooperate in ways which would cause them to violate local public
policy, a problem of not a little concern since there are wide contrasts
between the basic principles of the various national legal systems,
particularly as to rules governing the admission of evidence. In civil
proceedings of most European countries, the parties are disqualified
as witnesses and cannot be examined under oath. While this disa-
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bility of a party to act as witness seems to be based on reasons of
public policy, it remains open to doubt whether a request to take
testimony of a party will be honored by the courts of these countries
(Belgium, p. 39; France, p. 161; Italy, p. 261). Clearly, it would be
a serious inconvenience to common-law judges to have their requests
for examination of a party as a witness under oath be rejected by
European courts.
Moreover, the ability, or inability, of a court to obtain evidence
from a foreign country has an effect on the application of evidentiary
rules in the court requesting the evidence. For instance, the United
States has recently extended the possibility of compelling the production of tangible evidence abroad (app. A, p. 412), but compulsory
production will not be ordered if the law of the foreign country
effectively forbids production. This, in turn, affects the application
of other evidentiary rules, for instance, the best evidence rule.1
The variations benveen countries in the treatment of expert
witnesses also gives rise to some difficulties in international judicial
cooperation. In the civil-law countries, the expert is not a witness but
an auxiliary judge and thus in most countries is required to be a
citizen (France, p. 135). Consequently, it is difficult to appoint an impartial expert in a foreign country unless a qualified citizen happens
to be available there. Obstacles of this nature, however, may not prove
insurmountable; international conventions often waive the requirement that the expert be a national. 2 Yet, doubts still exist as to the
scope of the expert's task and the proper weight to be given his
testimony. In this connection the role of the impartial expert must
be distinguished from that of the partisan expert familiar to Americans. An impartial expert is appointed by the court and must assist
the court in obtaining and evaluating evidence, while an expert
witness serves one of the parties and is subject to examination and
cross-examination. Nevertheless, one should not overlook the current
developments taking place in regard to expert testimony in the common-law countries, especially in the United States where there is
now less concern for the adversary aspects of the expert testimony.
According to the Model Code of Evidence and to the Model Expert
Testimony Act, the expert may be appointed by the court as an impartial expert. This tendency to follow the civil-law practice will
reduce the difficulties of appointing experts through letters rogatory
and evaluating expert testimony obtained abroad.
We must therefore recognize that the various legal systems are
evolving in such a way that the differences which hitherto have
represented the main obstacle to international judicial cooperation
1. On this subject, see Cleary &: Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation
in Context, 51 IowA L. REv. 825, 843 (1966).
2. See Hague Convention on Civil Procedure, art. 16 (1954).
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are being reduced. Moreover, in recent years the judges in some
countries have shown, in the face of practical necessities, a laudable
willingness to allow a more liberal interpretation of "public policy,"
which, in turn, assists the process of evolution in their respective
systems. For example, it is well known that one of the characteristics
of the admission of evidence in the civil-law countries is to preface
the examination of witnesses with the specific questions of fact, thus
providing a limit to the examination itself.3 Nevertheless, European
judges have been disposed to extend the examination to other facts
bearing on the case, even if they are not specified in the letters rogatory (Belgium, p. 37 and Switzerland, p. 368). Similarly, the tendency
of Italian judges to admit evidence obtained abroad, even if different
methods from those employed in Italy have been used, has recently
led to the admission of a deposition taken in Germany upon the
witness' sworn confirmation of its validity.4
In conclusion, the present book not only offers to legal practitioners a wide and well-documented view of the law in force in
fifteen selected countries, but also reveals the main trends of future
reconciliation in international judicial relationships. Probably the
best method of achieving cooperation is to permit judges in the
various countries to employ sufficiently flexible rules to meet the
needs of justice in particular cases, without adhering too strictly to
doctrines peculiar to their own individual systems. In other words, it
seems easier to overcome the present difficulties on the judicial plane
rather than through legislation. Still, it must be emphasized that in
order for judges to function effectively in this area, they must be
given the necessary freedom of action.
One final comment may be apposite. In this field, as in others
where comparative methods of research are employed, the "factual
approach" seems the best means of investigating the points of contact between the life of the law in different systems. Such investigations do much to help the law stay in harmony with the growing
development of international relationships.

Vittorio S. Denti,
Professor of Civil Procedure,
Faculty of Law,
Pavia University, Italy
3. This feature, however, is declining. In France, for instance, it has been abrogated by the reform of 1958. See SICARD, LA PREUVE EN JUSTICE APRES LA REFORME JUDI•
CIAIRE 252 (1960).
4. See d'Alfonso v. Kieselhorst, [1967] Foro Ital. I 184 (Corte di Cassazione).

